A series of national security leaks to the press led to the current public inquiry on foreign interference but the report of one CSIS indicating Beijing was targeting MPs, which the government ignored, played a major role in forcing Ottawa to hold an inquiry. Dated July 20, 2021, and titled “PRC Foreign Interference in Canada: A Critical National Security Threat,” the CSIS report said that foreign interference activities by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) “continue to be sophisticated, pervasive and persistent” and use a “complex array” of “overt and covert mechanisms.”
The “Top Secret/Canadian Eyes Only” assessment had been leaked to the Globe and Mail, which reported that CSIS said China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) “has taken specific actions to target Canadian MPs.” A national security source told the Globe the targeted MP was Conservative Michael Chong. This revelation led to louder calls from opposition parties to launch a public inquiry. Initially, the government had appointed former Governor General David Johnston as a special rapporteur instead of launching an inquiry, but he resigned under pressure in June due to conflict-of-interest concerns regarding his ties to the Trudeau Foundation and the Trudeau family.
The purpose of the CSIS intelligence assessment is said to provide a baseline to understand the “intent, motives, and scope” of Chinese regime interference in Canada. Its “Key Assessments” include that the PRC is the “foremost perpetrator” of foreign interference activity in Canada and “pragmatically targets all levels of government … diasporas groups, media entities, dissidents, activists, elites, elected officials and academics.” The report describes how the Chinese regime’s approach to diplomatic influence is “fundamentally different” than that of Canada’s, and it mentions how Beijing’s United Front Work Department (UFWD) is “critical” to its efforts to seek to exercise “long-term and full-scale influence” to achieve its strategic objectives.
CSIS says the CCP’s focus is to target all levels of government and civil society such as diaspora groups, the public, and the media. It also says that while the Chinese diaspora is the main focus of interference efforts, Beijing can target anyone perceived as holding potential value through either “inducements or coercive means.” The CSIS assessment also discusses the CCP’s use of social media to target its opponents.
CSIS Director David Vigneault testified before the commission and explained the rationale for redactions that were applied to documents submitted to the inquiry. He said assessments that provide an overview are easier to release to the public compared to raw intelligence, and he added that more dated documents also carry less risk of causing injury to national security if disclosed.